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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The County defendants' position and response to the 
Coalition's Brief of Appellants fails to address three vital 
issues in this case. First, the County defendants ignore the 
decision in Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 
406 (Utah 1986) where this Court held that a statute which trans-
gresses a constitutional proscription is unconstitutional irre-
spective of any state purpose being furthered or any public good 
being derived. Consequently, the merits of a statute or the 
extent to which it accomplishes perceived public policy is irrel-
evant to whether the statute passes constitutional muster. Sup-
posedly -virtuous" laws are not necessarily interchangeable with 
"constitutional" ones. The only relevant inquiries in this case 
are: what specifically does Article XIII, Section 5 prohibit, 
and does Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) ("Section 17-19-15") 
attempt to do what the Constitution proscribes. 
Second, the County defendants ignore the state consti-
tutional framework by supposing that the Tax Commission's super-
visory powers over counties somehow vests the counties' constitu-
tionally delegated powers in the state. On the contrary, each 
county has certain constitutional rights, powers and duties of 
self-government, which are inherent in the county, and which can-
not be wrenched from their control or subsumed by a supervisory 
entity• In any event, the County defendants ignore the fact that 
Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes more th^n the intrusion into 
functions or duties of local government officials; Article XIII, 
Section 5 also proscribes the use of state tax levy proceeds to 
fund local government expenses. 
Third, the County defendants ignore the constitutional 
founding upon which the state's education system stands. The 
Uniform School Fund is constitutionally mandated, and the funding 
mechanism for the Uniform School Fund is thereby constitutionally 
authorized. The Uniform School Fund and the property tax redis-
tribution scheme here challenged are critically dissimilar. Sec-
tion 17-19-15 cannot be saved by imitating the mechanical opera-
tion of the taxing scheme under the Uniform School Fund, as the 
County defendants argue, because the constitutional authority for 
the fund and constitutional proscription against the property tax 
scheme arise from different parts of the Ut^ ah Constitution, both 
of which must be given effect. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 PROHIBITS A STATE 
LEVY FOR COUNTY PURPOSES REGARDLESS OF A CON-
COMITANT STATEWIDE PURPOSE BEING FURTHERED. 
The County defendants' response to the Coalition's 
Brief fails to address this Court's holding in Utah Technology, 
and for the same reason is fatally defective. While the County 
defendants are quick to cite various provisions of Utah Technol-
ogy such as "acts of the Legislature are presumed constitu-
tional, " or "that the judiciary [should] not interfere with 
enactments of the legislature where disagreement is founded only 
on policy considerations," (Brief of Respondents at 18, 26) the 
County defendants did not mention the most significant aspect of 
that decision, i.e., its holding. Utah Technology held that 
regardless of how meritorious a statute may be, whether the pub-
lic thereby benefits or whether the purpose for the statute is to 
accomplish a statewide need, if a statute does that which is con-
stitutionally proscribed, the statute is unconstitutional. In 
the Court's words: 
However, the legislature's findings of a 
public purpose are of no avail in this 
instance. The constitutional convention in 
promulgating section 29 and its subsequent 
adoption by the electorate of this state have 
foreclosed any speculation or further debate 
on that issue. . . . The state is foreclosed 
from subscribing even though the legislature 
may determine that public benefits will flow 
therefrom. 
-3-
Id, at 414. 
Thus, the County defendants' repeated statements as to 
the merits of Section 17-19-15 - that it serves a statewide pur-
pose, or that the counties supposedly face financial disaster if 
it is ruled unconstitutional - are IRRELEVANT. "Whether the 
public benefits thereby is of no consequence." Utah Technology 
at 414. The only relevant inquiries are: what does Article XIII, 
Section 5 proscribe, and does Section 17-19-+15 attempt to do what 
2 
the Constitution prohibits. 
In interpreting Article XIII, Section 5, the Utah 
Supreme Court has made the following statements which explicitly 
define what Article XIII, Section 5 prohibits: 
Under the constitution the state l^ as no power 
to make a disposition of county funds, and 
require that they be appropriated for other 
and different purposes than those for which 
by authority of the county they were 
collected. 
State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061, 1063 (1901). 
The power to collect and control the revenues 
of a municipality is of the very essence of 
local self government. Upon principle and 
the great weight of authority, section 5 of 
article 13 of our state constitution 
1
 The County defendants claim of pending financial chaos is 
not only irrelevant, it is unsupported by any evidence. 
2 For this reason, the County defendants' framing of the first 
Statement of Issues is overly broad, and asks the obvious. 
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precludes the Legislature from imposing a 
license tax upon the inhabitants of a city, 
town, or county for the sole purpose of rais-
ing revenue for such city, town, or country. 
The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001, 
1003-4 (1935) (emphasis added). 
Here [Article XIII, Section 5] is indicated 
an intention to have local business trans-
acted and local affairs managed and con-
trolled by local authorities. And the term 
-assess,- as here employed, has a comprehen-
sive meaning. It includes the valuation of 
property, as well as the levying of the rate 
of taxation. 
State v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 340 (1904). 
From Article XIII, Section 5's own language and these 
cases, it is conclusive the Utah Constitution prohibits: (1) the 
legislature's intrusion into the local affairs of a county; i.e., 
controlling or regulating inherent county functions, specifically 
including the assessment and levying of taxes; and (2) the 
state's use of the proceeds from a state compelled county levy to 
fund county expenditures. A critically significant, though usu-
ally overlooked aspect of Article XIII, Section 5, is that it 
proscribes not only the intrusion by the state into inherently 
Eldredqe at 339 and The Best Foods at 1003-4. 
Standford at 1063. 
county functions, but also precludes state levy proceeds from 
being used to fund local county functions and expenses. 
5 
The later cases have not overruled these early cases, 
but reinforce their holdings that the autonomy and independence 
of a county must be preserved. The County defendants argue that 
this Court has taken a Hfar more pragmatic approach in later 
years" and that w[t]hese later cases stress the importance of 
granting deference to legislative enactment^ responding to state-
wide concerns.- Brief of Respondents at 23. In this the County 
defendants again err. The County defendants repeatedly fail to 
recognize that in determining whether a statute violates a spe-
cific constitutional provision, the Court cannot, and should not, 
give any deference to the legislature's declarations of public 
policy or purpose. See Utah Technology at 413; Standford at 
1062; and Eldredge at 339. If a statute does what the constitu-
tion prohibits, it cannot be upheld simply because it may be "in 
response to statewide concerns.-
Thus the Court in Tribe did not uphold the apportion-
ment of ad valorem taxes to service revenue bonds issued by the 
Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency to finance a redevelopment 
5
 E.g., Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1975) and Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 
598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). 
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project merely because a statewide purpose was being furthered. 
The reason the Court upheld the statute, or better stated, the 
reason the statute was not declared unconstitutional, is because 
the revenues collected by the county, which were directed to and 
used by the redevelopment agency to service the debt on the reve-
nue bonds, did not violate any specific constitutional con-
straints. There was no violation of a specific constitutional 
restraint because the redevelopment agency, as extensively dis-
cussed in the decision, was not a municipality, but an arm of the 
state. 
The agency is a quasi-municipal corporation, 
a public agency created for beneficial and 
necessary public purposes. It is not a true 
municipal corporation, having power of local 
government, but an agency of the state 
designed for state purposes. 
Tribe at 503 (emphasis added). 
Because of this critical fact, the taxes were not being 
used to fund county expenditures in violation of Article XIII, 
Section 5, but were directed to the redevelopment agency for its 
use. The same concept is explained in Salt Lake County v. Salt 
Lake City to which Tribe cited as the basis for concluding that 
6
 In Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City was required by state 
statute to reimburse Salt Lake County for the expenses of caring 
for delinquent children sent to the county detention home. Salt 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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no specific constitutional provision was violated. The County 
defendants tout Salt Lake County v. Salt Ijiake City as authority 
for their argument that supervisory arms of government can compel 
action by an inferior governmental entity. To some extent, that 
is true, but in this case, the County defendants' reliance on 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City obfuscates the issues. The 
holding in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City specifically states 
that "what is required of Salt Lake City is required from it as 
an arm or agency of the state government, and in no way affects 
or interferes with any of its functions as a municipal corpora-
tion governing its own affairs." Salt Lake County at 563 (empha-
sis added). Once again the County defendants failed to address 
the most significant aspect of the case. 
The County defendants also cite Tribe to support the 
constitutionality of Section 17-19-15 on the theory that the 
state may unabatedly *require imposition 0f a tax for or the 
diversion of local revenue to [an] identified specific statewide 
purpose.- Brief of Respondents at 24. In Tribe, this was true 
only because the redevelopment agency was an arm of the state; 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Lake City argued that the statute requiring reimbursement was 
unconstitutional under Article XIII, Section 5. 
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thus the levy and distribution of tax proceeds was not to a 
county for the purpose of funding inherent county functions and 
expenses. Without discussing the facts in Salt Lake County v. 
Murray City Redevelopment, the Court reached the same conclusion 
for the same reasons as discussed in Tribe. The Murray City 
Redevelopment Agency was likewise an arm of the state and the tax 
proceeds apportioned to it were not used to fund inherent county 
7 
functions or expenses. 
The County defendants attempt to dilute the standards 
this Court has already set for Article XIII, Section 5 by 
attempting to distinguish the case law. For example, the County 
defendants incorrectly infer that this Court invalidated the 
statute under scrutiny in Standford under Article XIII, Section 5 
because the Court could not find a statewide purpose being fur-
thered. Again, this ignores the appropriate test. Even if a 
state purpose was present, the Court still would have struck down 
the statute because it unconstitutionally interfered with local 
county affairs. Next, the County defendants attempt to 
7
 It is also important to stress that the Supreme Court in 
Murray held that the county was not "being deprived of its power 
to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corpora-
tion. w Id. at 1343. This statement implicitly recognizes that 
one of the inherent functions of counties is the right "to assess 
and collect taxes for all purposes" of that county. 
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distinguish the present appeal from Standford by arguing that 
there is no intrusion into the local county's affairs since bud-
gets and expenditures under Section 17-19-1$ remain under county 
control. This is not true. The state's intrusion into county 
affairs under Section 17-19-15 continually exists. No longer 
does each county have the discretion to ideritify, budget and levy 
for costs the county deems legitimate. While the local taxpayer 
may voice objection to a specific county budget, the resulting 
levy reflects twenty-nine counties' budget$, and, consequently, 
the local electorate is powerless to control the levy process, 
and local officials are unaccountable. This erosion of local 
political power has constitutional significance. As this Court 
explained in Salt Lake City v. International Association of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1977): 
The political power which the people 
possess under Article I, Sec. 2, and which 
they confer on their elected representatives 
is to be exercised by persons respbnsible and 
accountable to the people—not independent of 
them.8 
Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All political power is inherent in the 
people; and all free governments ^re founded 
on their authority for their equal protection 
and benefit, and they have the right to alter 
or reform their government as phe public 
welfare may require. 
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The budgets which the counties submit to the state must 
fall within certain cost categories set by the state. The costs 
which the counties submit to the state must be certified by the 
state. To argue that the counties retain control over their bud-
gets and expenditures in light of these state controls is to tri-
fle with the plain language of Section 17-19-15. These state 
controls are a prime example of unconstitutional intrusion into 
inherent county affairs as proscribed by Article XIII, Section 5, 
and as interpreted by case law, both because of the intrusion 
into the inherent county functions of assessment, levy and col-
lection of taxes, and because the proceeds of a state levy are 
being used to fund inherent county functions and expenses. 
II• THE POWER TO ASSESS, LEVY AND COLLECT TAXES 
IS AMONG THE INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF A COUNTY. 
The County defendants once again undermine their own 
inherent power and authority to administer their own affairs, 
including the assessment, levy and collection of taxes, by argu-
ing that "[t]he constitutional separation of state and local 
functions has been abolished and the clear supervisory control of 
the State Tax Commission has been reinforced.- Brief of Respon-
dents at 20. This is also incorrect. As a matter of law, the 
statement flies in the face of this Court's decisions which 
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declare that the sovereignty and inherent political power vested 
in local government is paramount to our legal system, and that 
the Constitution stands to maintain and project that sovereignty• 
As this Court said in Standford: 
The constitution was doubtless framed 
and adopted with a purpose to prbtect local 
self-governments which had existed of a prac-
tically uniform character from the early set-
tlement of the country, since whicfh they have 
remained undisturbed, and the continued 
existence of which is therein assumed, and 
from which the liberty of the people spring 
and depend. 
Id. at 1062. 
The County defendants' argument is also confusing 
because it interchanges supervisory powers with original powers. 
To understand the constitutional proscription of Article XIII, 
Section 5, it is necessary to recognize the inherent powers and 
responsibilities which are constitutionally vested in local gov-
ernments; i.e., to assess, levy and collect taxes, to govern its 
own affairs, to set its own budgets; tp pay the costs and 
expenses of its operations. The County defendants attempt to 
justify Section 17-19-15 as not infringing on these inherent 
local powers by identifying various supervisory powers that the 
state has over the counties. The County defendants would have 
the Court believe that to claim that "functions [which] are 
reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally elected 
-12-
officials and financed partially or totally by county general 
fund revenues . . . are purely local functions, ignores the sig-
nificant historical role which the State Legislature and State 
Tax Commission have played in all local assessment issues." 
Brief of Respondents at 9. From that, the County defendants con-
clude that "the Legislature and Tax Commission have, to a large 
degree, completely assumed control of the local administration of 
g 
the property tax system", and thus Section 17-19-15 does nothing 
more than carry out state functions and purposes. Brief of 
Respondents at 11 (emphasis added). 
While the Coalition recognizes the Tax Commission's 
various roles in county taxation, the Tax Commission's revision 
of tax levies or other supervisory powers hardly qualify as con-
stitutionally vested authority to levy taxes in the first 
instance. Original powers to levy are vested in the county. As 
this Court has previously stated: 
An examination of the constitution will show 
that at least by implication local 
self-government to the people of each county 
is intended to be imposed and recognized. 
Standford at 1062. 
9 This argument is inconsistent because, at the same time, the 
County defendants state the "[b]udgets and expenditures remain 
under county control." Brief of Respondents at 19. 
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After citing various constitutional provisions regard-
ing the establishment and powers of the qounties this Court 
concluded: 
The constitution implies a right of local 
self-government to each county, and a right 
to establish a system of county government is 
expressly recognized and enjoined* 
Id. 
This Court has also recognized the need to protect 
these constitutional safeguards: 
While the implied restrictions upon the power 
of the legislature with reference to local 
self-government are not defined with the par-
ticularity and incisiveness they could have 
been, yet they are imperative in ^heir char-
acter, and when the courts find 4 case pre-
sented for consideration which is clearly 
within such provisions it has no alternative 
but to conform to authority. 
Id., accord. Utah Technology. 
See Sections 1 and 4, Article XI, which recognize the 
existence of the several counties as legal subdivisions of the 
state and the establishment of a system of county governments; 
Section 3, Article XIV, which prohibits any county from creating 
any indebtedness in excess of the taxes for the current year 
without a vote of the electors thereof; Section 6, Article XIV, 
which prohibits the state from assessing thq debt of any county; 
Section 3, Article XI, which prohibits the legislature from 
changing county lines without a vote of the electors of the 
counties interested; and finally, Section 5, Article XIII, which 
prohibits the Legislature from imposing taxes for the purpose of 
any county, but may vest the corporate authorities thereof, with 
the power to assess and collect taxes for the purpose of such 
corporation. 
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In State v. Eldredge, this Court similarly stated: 
The constitution of this state, the same as 
of every other state, was framed with local 
self-government in view. 
The idea which promotes our whole system is 
that local authority shall manage and control 
local affairs. 
Eldredge at 339-340. 
Finally, this Court in The Best Foods stated: 
There can be no doubt but that the framers of 
our Constitution recognized the rights of the 
people of Utah to local self-government. It 
was to preserve local self-government free 
from needless legislative interference that 
the power to levy taxes for local purposes 
was by the state constitution vested exclu-
sively in the proper authority of counties, 
cities, towns, and other municipal corpora-
tions. The power to collect and control the 
revenues of a municipality is of the very 
essence of local self-government. 
The Best Foods at 1003. 
The County defendants would have the Court ignore these 
constitutionally mandated county rights and powers to assess, 
levy and collect taxes as a means of funding county operations 
simply because the state has various supervisory powers. While 
the state's supervisory powers include a responsibility to 
ensure equalization, the state's ultimate authority over equal-
ization does not give it the right to assess, levy or collect 
taxes for county purposes or to fund county expenditures. 
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To illustrate this principle, an analogy to our present 
court system is appropriate. Article VIII, Section 1 vests the 
judicial power of the state in the Supreme Court and the district 
courts (and such other courts as the legislature establishes). 
The Supreme Court by and large is an appellate court and has var-
ious supervisory roles and powers. The Supreme Court adopts 
rules of procedure and evidence for use in the state courts. The 
Supreme Court is responsible to manage th£ appellate process. 
The Supreme Court may authorize retired justices and judges pro 
tempore to perform any judicial duties. the Supreme Court is 
also responsible for governing the practioe of law, including 
admissions and disciplinary matters. Certainly the Supreme Court 
is extensively and intimately involved in the supervision and 
administration of the legal system, including the supervision of 
the district courts. 
District courts have original jurisdiction in all mat-
ters except as limited by the constitution or statute. This 
jurisdictional authority is inherent in the district court and 
cannot be ignored or usurped irrespective of any supervisory con-
trol a higher court has over the district cc^ urt. Everyone would 
agree that while the Supreme Court exercises extensive supervi-
sion and control over the district court, the Supreme Court does 
not have original jurisdiction over most masters. This concept 
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is at least as old as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 171 
(1803) where Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking for the United 
States Supreme Court, wrote: "If congress remains at liberty to 
give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution 
has declared its jurisdiction shall be original; and original 
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be 
appellate; the distribution of justice, made in the constitution; 
is form without substance." The same principle applies to the 
state's supervisory powers over taxation- Although the state has 
a great deal of involvement in supervising local matters, there 
is no constitutional authority for the state to perform those 
duties the Constitution vests in local governments. In fact, 
that is Article XIII, Section 5's very purpose - to prohibit such 
an intrusion. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that Article XIII, Sec-
tion 5 also prohibits state intrusion into local affairs 
vis-a-vis using the proceeds of a state levy to fund county 
expenditures. The County defendants lose sight of this fact in 
their repeated arguments that the state' s supervisory and equal-
ization powers do not intrude into the counties * inherent duties 
and responsibilities. Nowhere do the County defendants discuss 
why the use of state levy proceeds to fund local expenditures 
does not violate Article XIII, Section 5. In fact, the County 
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defendants repeatedly indicate that Section 17-19-15's purpose is 
to fund inherently county expenses• Beqause Section 17-19-15 
imposes a state levy, the proceeds of which are used to fund 
local county expenditures, the statute is ^constitutional under 
Article XIII, Section 5. 
III. THE UNIFORM SCHOOL FUND STANDS ON AN ENTIRELY 
SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL FOOTING. 
Article X, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution mandates 
that the "Legislature shall provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of the state's education system." Section 5 of Arti-
cle X provides for the establishment of th£ Uniform School Fund 
for the support of the state's education system, and the means by 
which the Uniform School Fund is to be funded. By a delegation 
of authority, the Constitution authorize$ the Legislature to 
appropriate revenues to fund the Uniform Scphool Fund. Pursuant 
to that constitutional delegation of authority, the Legislature 
enacted a taxing scheme to raise revenues for the Uniform School 
Fund. Seef e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-902 (1989). That taxing 
scheme involves the redistribution of revenues raised from state 
levies to various school districts. Th$ crucial difference 
11
 "The statute under attack is a funding mechanism 
designed . . . [for] paying the costs of assessing, collecting 
and distributing property taxes." Brief of Respondents at 17. 
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between this taxing scheme and Section 17-19-15 is, that while 
the taxing mechanism to fund the Uniform School Fund is not spec-
ified in the Constitution, the legislature was constitutionally 
12 delegated the authority to create such a funding mechanism. 
x
* Article X, Section 5 must be construed in pari materia or as 
a comprehensive whole with Article XIII, Section 5, giving effect 
to both if possible. See State Board of Education v. State Board 
of Higher Education, 505 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1973). To the extent 
these provisions as to the levy and distribution of taxes for 
public schools conflict, Article X, Sections 1 and 5 would 
control over Article XIII, Section 5 because the former are a 
specific provision (vesting the legislature with authority to 
establish and maintain a public school system) whereas the latter 
is a general provision (proscribing the imposition of state taxes 
for the purpose of any county) . See, e.g., de'Sha v. Reed, 572 
P.2d 821 (Colo. 1977). Prior to 1973, ad valorem taxation for 
education was constitutionally vested in school districts and 
separated from the counties. Former Article X, Section 6 
(repealed in 1973 by the electorate; see laws 1971, Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 2) provided: "In cities of the first and second 
class the public school system shall be controlled by the Board 
of Education of such cities, separate and apart from the coun-
ties.- This meant, as construed by this Court in Board of 
Education v. Burgon, 217 P. 1112, 1113 (Utah 1923) that the Board 
of Education had "the right to determine its revenues without 
interference or restriction by the county." (Emphasis added.) 
Historically, city school districts* power to tax has always 
originated from a different constitutional source than the 
counties' power to tax. The Uniform School Fund does not violate 
Article XIII, Section 5 because the latter section's coverage is 
restricted to "any county, city, town or other municipal corpora-
tion," not school districts. Notwithstanding the repeal of 
Article X, Section 6, ad valorem taxation for school districts is 
not restricted by Article XIII, Section 5. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53A-2-108(2) (1989), consistent with Article XIII, Section 5, 
states: "Each school district shall be controlled by its board of 
education and shall be independent of municipal and county 
governments." 
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The distribution scheme for the Uniform School Fund stands upon 
the same constitutional footing as the establishment of the fund 
itself • Here again, this concept is at lea$t as old as M'Culloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 407 (1819), whe£e Chief Justice John 
Marshall, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, wrote: 
The government which has a rigl^ t to do an 
act, and has imposed on it the 4uty of per-
forming that act, must, according to the dic-
tates of reason, be allowed to select the 
means; and those who contend that it may not 
select any appropriate means, th^t one par-
ticular mode of effecting the object is 
excepted, take upon themselves th^ heavy bur-
den of establishing that exception. 
The County defendants repeatedly refer to the taxing 
scheme under the Uniform School Fund for authority that Section 
17-19-15 is equally constitutional. Specifically, the County 
defendants state that Section 17-19-15 Mw^s closely modeled on 
the financing mechanism for the state supported minimum school 
program (Uniform School Fund)." Brief of Respondents at 15. 
This argument is specious. The mere fact t^ hat Section 17-19-15 
adopts the mechanics of the taxing scheme under the Uniform 
School Fund does not give Section 17-19-15 equal constitutional 
approbation. Clearly the taxing scheme und^r the Uniform School 
Fund stands on entirely different constitutional footing than do 
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state imposed ad valorem taxes. The state has the constitu-
tional right and obligation to fund public schools; it has no 
similar constitutional right to impose taxes for a county 
purpose. 
The County defendants also refer to Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-2-318 (1987) which provides that the costs of preparation of 
plat maps is to be borne by the Tax Commission and appropriated 
out of the Uniform School Fund to the counties. The County 
defendants maintain that this statute is likewise identical to 
Section 17-19-15. Here again the County defendants are mistaken. 
In response, it is necessary to consider Section 59-2-318*s pur-
pose. The County defendants indicate that "as part of its effort 
to guarantee accuracy of assessment for purposes of equality 
within the equalized tax levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, 
the Legislature . . . provided that uniform minimum standards in 
real property plat maps used by counties for property tax assess-
ments would be established. . . .w Brief of Respondents at 13. 
1 3
 As set forth in the Coalition's Brief of Appellants, the 
Utah Attorney General has similarly stated that "a legislative 
scheme requiring taxes to be collected by counties for the 
benefit of school districts has been distinguished from a scheme 
requiring taxes to be collected by counties for their own use." 
Attorney General, Formal Opinion No. 88-01, February 11, 1988 
(citing Board of Education v. Burgon, 62 Utah 102, 217 P. 1112 
(1923) and Board of Education v. Daines, 12 Utah 97, 166 P. 977 
(1917). 
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Hence, the purpose of revising plat maps wa3 to ensure the equal-
ity of assessment of the taxing scheme und^r the Uniform School 
Fund. For this reason, the costs of this statute is borne by the 
Uniform School Fund. As discussed above, the Uniform School 
Fund, and the costs and expenses which it supports are constitu-
tionally sanctioned under Article X. 
IV, SECTION 17-19-15 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATES 
REVENUE SHARING. 
Article XIII, Section 5 only permits the consensual 
sharing of taxes with other political subdivisions of the state. 
The County defendants repeatedly claim that the various organiza-
tional associations of counties support Seption 17-19-15. The 
Coalition does not dispute this fact, although that fact is, once 
again, irrelevant. The relevant fact is that no county has taken 
official action to adopt and incorporate tljie provisions of Sec-
tion 17-19-15. Neither has any county taken any requisite action 
to authorize the sharing of tax proceeds with other counties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-2 (1989) provides that a county must exer-
cise its power "only by board of county commissioners or by 
agents and officers acting under authority of the board or 
authority of law.w Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-^ .6.5 (1989) similarly 
states: 
Any county, city, town or other lo^al politi-
cal subdivision may, at the discretion of the 
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local governing body, share its tax and other 
revenues with other counties, cities, towns 
or other local political subdivision. Any 
decision to share tax and other revenues 
shall be by local ordinance, resolution, or 
interlocal agreement. 
Section 17-19-15, with its mandatory revenue sharing, 
is a state statute, not a local ordinance, resolution or 
interlocal agreement. Moreover, the counties have not provided, 
by affidavit or otherwise, any local ordinance, resolution, or 
other interlocal agreement between counties by which revenue 
raised through ad valorem taxation will be shared. 
V. THE COALITION HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17-19-15. 
For the reasons set forth in the Coalition's Brief of 
Appellants, Section I, pages 12-15, the Coalition members have 
standing to contest the constitutionality of Section 17-19-15. 
CONCLUSION 
Article XIII, Section 5 prohibits the state from 
intruding upon inherent county functions such as the assessment 
levy and collection of ad valorem taxes and using the proceeds of 
state levies to fund inherent county expenses. Section 17-19-15 
does exactly what Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes because 
under the statute, state officials compel the counties to levy an 
ad valorem tax and then redistribute tax revenues generated by 
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the state levy to fund county expenses• Section 17-19-15 is 
unconstitutional on its face. 
DATED this day of 1990. 
JAMES B. LEE 
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
MAXWELL A. MILXER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLfl & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Coalition 
185 South Statie Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898J 
Salt Lake CityL UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (80|1) 532-1234 
-24-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS to the following on this 28th day of March, 1990: 
Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
Ralph Finlayson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for "State Defendants" 
Rm. 236 State Capitol Bldg-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy 
County Attorney 
Attorney for "County Defendants" 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
284:031390A 
-25-
